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2Dfi GowANLOCK v. 'l'UR:'\ER [42 C.2d 
P. .) "The 
necessary that the plaintiffs 
have complied with the statute at the time of the commenee-
ment of the action; tlu1t it is suffi~ient if thry have done so 
at the time at least when issue as to the matter of abateTnent 
v. SoutheTn JJI. & R. Co. 
282 P. that issue 
has never been made. 
It follows that the judgment of the trial court should 
be reversed. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied March 25, 
1954. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[S. F. Nos. 18640. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1954.] 
'l'HOMAS W. GOWANIJOCK et al., Respondents, v. JAMES 
TURNER, as Manager of Utilities, etc., et al., Appel-
lants; JOSEPH ROBINSON, Intervener and Appellant. 
[1] Statutes-Mandatory and Directory Acts.--Requirements of a 
statute are directory, not mandatory, unless means be pro-
vided for its enforcement. 
[2] Municipal Corporations-Employees- Compensation- Hours 
of Service and Overtime.-San Francisco Charter, § 12.5, de-
fining basie work day for platform men or bus operators in 
municipal railway system as eight hours, to be completed with-
in ten consecutive hours, and providing overtime pay for all 
labor in excess of eight hours in any one day, 
does not require city to pay for eight hours of work on a 
given day or 48 hours per week regardless of duties performed, 
but merely specifies basis of compensation for employees. 
[3] !d.-Employees-Compensation--Hours of Service and Over-
time.-Failme of former San l~rancisco Charter, § 33 (carried 
into § 150 of new charter in 1932) to change basic provision 
that "No ... employee of the City and County shall be paid 
for a greater time than that covered by his actual service," at 
time § 125 of chnrter, relating to bnsic work da.Y for platform 
men or bus operators in municipal rail w:c1y system, was 
See Cal.Jur., § 247 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Municipal Corporations, 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Statutes, § 11; [2-C'>] Municipal Cor-
porntions, § 301; [G-11] Municipal Corporations, § 302. 
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amended in 1924 and 1925, shows a legislative intent to specify 
a basis of compensation for railroad workers not in conflict 
with existing mandate of charter prohibiting payment for 
service not performed. 
[ 4] !d.-Employees-Compensation-Hours of Service and Over-
time.-In view of provision of former charter of San Fran-
cisco specifying a minimum wage and maximum hours of work 
for employees on railways privately owned, with overtime em-
ployment allowed if paid for at time and one-half, omission, 
from 1925 amendment of § 125 of charter, of similar provisions 
in regard to municipal railway may be taken as evidence that 
new proposal was not intended to guarantee either a par-
ticular amount of wages or a work day of a given number 
of hours. 
[5] !d.-Employees-Compensation-Hours of Service and Over-
time.-Mere established practice of municipal railway manage-
ment in San Francisco prior to 1946 of paying a full eight 
hours' pay for a regular run of seven hours and 45 minutes 
does not show an administrative interpretation in favor of an 
eight-hour guaranteed workday. 
[6] !d.-Employees- Compensation- Fixing of Compensation.-
Wages of employees of municipal railway cannot be fixed by 
formula provided in San Francisco Charter, § 151.3, that where 
there is established "a rate of pay for ... groups or crafts 
through collective bargaining agreements with employers em-
ploying such groups or crafts, and such rate is recognized 
and paid throughout the industry and the establishments em-
ploying such groups or crafts in San Francisco," the civil ser-
vice commission must certify to board of supervisors the pre-
vailing rates, since nearly all public transportation service 
in San Francisco is performed by municipal railway and, ac-
cordingly, there is no "prevailing rate of pay" established for 
street railway employees within city and county. 
[7] !d.-Employees- Compensation- Fixing of Compensation.-
N o distinction between use of term "rate of pay" in earlier 
part of San Francisco Charter, § 151.3, and use of "wages" 
and "wage schedules" in portion relating specifically to munic-
ipal railway employees was intended, where provisions relating 
to municipal railway employees use both "rate of pay" and 
"wages" interchangeably, and where both parts are aimed at 
providing standards of compensation for particular groups of 
city and county employees and vary only as to methods used 
in determining them. 
[8] !d.-Employees-Compensation-Rate of Pay.-A guarantee 
as to minimum hours of work does not affect rate of an em-
ployee's pay, that is, amount of compensation per unit of 
wo,.k, but deals only with number of hours of work to which 
m .. employee may claim to be entitled; such a provision is 
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without scope of municipal charter section establishing method 
of computing basic "rate of pay" for employees. 
[9] !d.-Employees- Compensation- Fixing of Compensation.-
San Francisco Charter, § 151.3, requiring wages of municipal 
railway employees to be computed annually on basis of two 
highest wag·e schedules of other street railways in state, does 
not require consideration of minimum hours of work guar-
antees in such schedules, since to pay each employee a mini-
mum of eight hours per day it would be necessary to revise 
entire operating schedule to provide work for such hours and 
to revise it continually with every change in guaranteed hours 
of those wage schedules to which reference would be made. 
[10] !d.-Employees-Compensation-Fixing of Compensation.-
In fixing wages of municipal railway employees according to 
San Francisco Charter, § 151.3, requiring an annual computa-
tion by averaging two highest wage schedules of other street 
railways in state established as of July 1st of each year, board 
of supervisors may not assign a monetary value to a specific 
guarantee of hours and average it with wages stated in 
schedules consulted, since if such method were adopted the 
board of supervisors would have to place a money value on all 
benefits received by employees under such schedules, and also 
on similar benefits guaranteed under charter, and fix wage 
schedule for municipal railway accordingly, thereby imposing 
on board the burden of evaluating an endless variety of 
benefits. 
[11] !d.-Employees-Compensation-Fixing of Compensation.-
It is not unreasonable to construe San Francisco Charter, 
§ 151.3, requiring wages of municipal railway employees to be 
fixed by averaging two highest wage schedules of other street 
railways in state, as placing on board of supervisors a simple 
averaging process; such board has sole authority to fix wages 
and salaries and, although it generally is vested with wide dis-
cretion in computing them, the charter section is a direct 
limitation on that power. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. I. L. Harris, Judge. 
Reversed. 
Action for declaratory relief, and proceeding in mandamus 
to compel manager of utilities of public utilities commission 
to approve and transmit to civil service commission payrolls 
crediting each employee with minimum of eight hours of 
work for each working day, and to compel civil service com-
mission to certify to board of supervisors a wage schedule 
guaranteeing minimum wages and hours of employment for 
the operating personnel. Judgment for petitioners reversed. 
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Dion R. Holm, City Attorney (San Francisco), and A. Dal 
Thomson, Public Utilities Counsel, for Appellants. 
Lamson, Jordan & Walsh for Intervener and Appellant. 
Tobriner & Lazarus, Mathew 0. Tobriner and Stanley H. 
Neyhart for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-Several employees of the municipal rail-
way of the city and county of San Francisco, on behalf of 
themselves and all other employees similarly situated, sued 
for writs of mandate and for declaratory relief. Named as 
defendants are the manager of utilities of the public utilities 
commission, the members of the civil service commission and 
its secretary, and the controller. Joseph Robinson, on behalf 
of the taxpayers of the city and county, has filed a complaint 
in intervention in opposition to the employees' complaint. 
By this action, the employees principally seek to obtain a 
determination as to their right to have work for certain mini-
mum hours. One theory of the complaint, based upon section 
125 of the charter of the city and county, is that every oper-
ating employee is entitled to receive compensation for a 
minimum of eight hours of work in each working day. An 
alternative theory is that section 151.3 of the charter, which 
establishes a method of computing wages based upon the wage 
schedules of certain other street railway systems, requires 
the consideration of any minimum wage guarantees included 
in such schedules. 
According to the stipulated facts, the streetcars and coaches 
of the municipal railway are operated over designated routes 
on schedules arranged by the manager of utilities and ap-
proved by the public utilities commission. These schedules 
have "straight time" runs, which require the continuous 
services of an operator for a period which may be more or 
less than eight hours, and ''split time'' runs, during which 
there is a period when the operator is off duty. "Split time" 
runs vary in the number of hours worked as well as in their 
total elapsed time, termed ''range time,'' which generally 
is less than 10 hours. "vV ork assignments are made on the 
basis of selection by the employees, in order of seniority. 
It is necessary from the standpoint of satisfactory opera-
tion of the municipal railway and a usual practice among 
street railways throughout the country to employ more oper-
ators than there are runs. Standby employees must be avail-
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able in case of absences and to handle unforeseen demands 
for increased transportation facilities. 'fhe employees who 
supply these needs are those who, for one reason or another, 
do not have a regular run. 
An extra employee is assigned to the division headquarters 
he selects. He is required to report at a designated time 
to a dispatcher who assigns him to the run of an absentee, 
or to a location at which he collects fares from passengers 
as they board a car or bus. In the event that no work is 
available, the dispatcher may designate a later report time, 
or he may dispense with the employee's services for that day. 
An operator who is given no work on a particular day is 
entitled to compensation for the time he spent in reporting. · 
Although some of the men on the extra list do not have work 
for eight hours each day, it is the policy of the manager of 
utilities to assign duties to the extent that, throughout the 
period of two weeks, each employee shall have received com-
pensation equivalent to the wages he would have earned had 
he worked 40 hours per week. 
The 1present action primarily concerns these extra men. 
However, the complaint indicates that it is intended to present 
the rights of some of the operators assigned to regular runs 
of less than eight hours per day. 
Five causes of action were pleaded. Two of them were 
determined adversely to the employees in the trial court and 
they are no longer in issue. 
In the first count, based upon section 125 of the city charter, 
the employees seek a writ of mandate to compel the manager 
of utilities to approve and transmit to the civil service com-
mission payrolls crediting each employee with a minimum of 
eight hours of work for each working day. By the fourth 
count, they ask the court to compel the civil service commis-
sion to certify to the board of supervisors a wage schedule 
which guarantees minimum wages and hours af employment 
for the operating personnel. The fifth count reiterates the 
allegations of the preceding ones and seeks a declaratory 
judgment in accordance with them. The appeal of the city 
officials and the intervener is from a judgment in favor of 
the employees upon each of these causes of action. 
The appellants take the position that section 125 of the 
charter provides only a formula for the payment of overtime 
and docs not establish maximum or minimum hours of work. 
Furthermore, they argue, the judgment is too uncertain in 
its terms to be capable of enforcement. The respondent 
Feb.1954] GowANLOCK v. TuRNER 
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employees are without standing to bring this action, the 
appellants also assert, and the city ofiicials named in the 
judgment are not the proper parties against whom such 
a judgment may be given. 
Since 1925, section 125 of the char.ter has read in part 
as follows: ''Persons employed as platform men or bus 
operators in the operating department of the municipal rail-
way system shall be subject to the following conditions of 
employment: The basic hours of labor shall be eight hours, 
to be completed within ten consecutive hours; there shall lw 
one day of rest in each week of seven days; all labor performed 
in excess of eight hours in any one day, or six days in any 
one week, shall be paid for at the rate of time and one-half.'' 
According to the respondents, this provision guarantees the 
employees eight hours of work within a range of 10 hours 
upon six days of each week, with pay for eight hours even 
if the work assignment is for less than that time on any 
particular day. The city contends that the only purpose of 
section 125 is to specify the rate of pay for all hours in excess 
of eight within 10 hours and for those worked after the 
expiration of 10 hours in any one day. 
The charter provision does nothing more than to specify 
the basis of compensation for employees. It declares that 
overtime shall be paid for all work done after eight hours 
and also after the lapse of 10 hours of actual service. Labor 
performed in excess of six days in any one week must be paid 
for at the rate of time and one-half. 
[l] The requirements of a statute are directory, not man-
datory, unless means be provided for its enforcement. [2] The 
charter includes no means of enforcing the requirement that 
all labor performed in excess of eight hours in any one day, all 
labor performed after the span of 10 hours in any one day, 
and all labor performed in excess of six days in any one 
week "shall be paid for at the rate of time and one-half." 
No requirement is laid upon the city to pay for eight hours 
of work on a given day or 48 hours per week regardless of 
the duties performed. 
The same construction was placed upon a federal statute 
which declared that "eight hours shall constitute a day's 
work for all laborers, workmen. and mechanics now employed, 
or who may be hereafter employed, by or on behalf of the 
government of the United States." (Act of June 25, 1868, 
ch. 72; 15 Stats.L. 77.) This legislation, said the court, 
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constituted only a direction by the government to its agents, 
and not a prohibition of the making of contracts which fixed 
a different length of time for daily service; ''the government 
officer is not prohibited ... from agreeing, when it is proper, 
that a less number of hours than eight shall be accepted as 
a day's work." (United States v. Martin, 94 U.S. 400, 403 
[24 L.Ed. 128].) A Massachusetts law was similarly inter-
preted. (Woods v. City of Woburn, 220 Mass. 416 [107 N.E. 
985, Ann.Cas. 1917A 492].) 
The respondents rely upon Chatfield v. City of Seattle, 
198 Wash. 179 [88 P.2d 582, 121 A.L.R. 1279] ; Goss v. Jtts-
tice of District Court of Holyoke, 302 Mass. 148 [18 N.E.2d 
546]; and Graham v. City of New York, 167 N.Y. 85 [60 
N.E. 331]. The opinion in none of them states the language 
of the statute or ordinance being considered, and the court's 
conclusions necessarily were based upon the legislation 
before it. 
[3] In 1924 and 1925, when section 125 of the charter 
was amended, section 33 of article XVI declared : ''No 
deputy, clerk, or other employee of the City and County 
shall be paid for a greater time than that covered by his 
actual service. " 1 It is reasonable to conclude that if the 
purpose of the proponents of the amendment was to change 
that basic provision, the new section would have so stated 
in no uncertain terms. The failure to do so shows a legis-
lative intent to specify a basis of compensation for railroad 
workers not in conflict with the existing mandate of the 
charter prohibiting payment for service not performed. 
[ 4] Another provision of the old charter provided for 
the wages and hours of labor of employees of railroads which 
operated under franchises granted by the city and county. 
It read: "Every franchise shall provide that employees of 
the person or company or corporation operating a street rail-
road shall be paid not less than three dollars a day and that 
eight hours shall be the maximum hours of labor in any calen-
dar day, the same to be completed within ten hours; provided, 
that nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit 
overtime employment, wages for such employment to be paid 
at one and one half times the said rate of wages proportionate 
1Section 33 was a part of the former charter from its inception 
(Stats. 1899, ch. 2 of Res., p. 241, at p. 364) and continued therein, 
unchanged, until that charter was superseded by the new charter in 1932. 
It was carried into section 150 of the new charter, enlarged to include 
officers. (Stats. 1931, ch. 56 of Res., p. 2973, at p. 3066.) 
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to each hour of such extra service.' '2 (.Art. III, ch. 2, § 7b.) 
This section in clear and unmistakable terms specifies a mini-
mum wage and maximum hours of work, overtime employment 
being allowed if paid for at time and one-half. With these 
requirements laid upon railways privately owned, the omis-
sion from the 1925 amendment of similar provisions in regard 
to the municipal railway may well be taken as evidence that 
the new proposal was not intended to guarantee either a 
particular amount of wages or a work day of a given number 
of hours. 
The city officials in charge of the municipal railway con-
sistently have operated it with an administrative interpreta-
tion of the charter as prescribing no guarantee of wages or 
hours of labor. .At the time the amendment was adopted, 
the superintendent of the railway submitted a report to the 
board of public works, then in charge of its operations, giving 
an estimate of the railway's needs in terms of personnel 
and wages. Shortly thereafter, at the superintendent's re-
quest, the president of Local 518, one of the sponsors of the 
amendment, submitted a written analysis of it in which he 
described the enactment as providing only a basis for com-
pensation. 3 
Following this correspondence, a number of conferences 
were held, attended by city officials and representatives of 
the men. .At that time the city attorney rendered an opinion 
2Added to the charter by the Statutes of 1911, ch. 25 of Res., p. 1661, 
at p. 1694. It continued unchanged during the life of the former charter. 
It was a part of that charter in 1924 and 1925. 
""Our interpretation of the ... [amendment] and also the opinion 
of legal minds with whom we have consulted is that the stipulations 
contained therein merely provide a basis of compensation and do not 
prevent the performance of any labor beyond the limitations described. 
''Supplementary to our opinion we refer you to the Adamson Eight 
Hour Law for Trainmen which while not identical, is in many respects 
similar to Charter Amendment No. 21. 
"We might also refer you to employment in many industries where 
the hours of labor must he stretched over a range that will supply the 
requirements of all concerned; in which event, the employer is subject 
to a penalty similar to that affixed by Amendment No. 21. 
"As an illustration of our opinion as to how the law would apply 
where the ten hour limit as set forth in the Amendment has been exceeded 
... the crew working run [15A] shall be paid straight time for work 
actually performed ... 7 hours and 5 minutes, and, for all work actually 
performed beyond the ten hours range, which [will be] ... 4 7 minutes, 
they shall be paid at the rate of time and one-half of one hours and 
eleven minutes; making a total of 8 hours and 16 minutes. 
'' 'l'he other feature of the amendment relative to one day of rest in 
seven may be construed in this manner. 
"You will note that the amendment establishes eight hours as being 
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in which said in "Most legislation limiting the 
hours of employees and restricting the number of days a 
week upon which labor may be performed, is adopted upon 
the theory that the shortening of time of labor promotes the 
health and comfort of the employe, and therefore, produces 
greater efficiency. But it is manifest from the very language 
of section 20 that it does not restrict the hours of labor for 
that reason. It creates a basic day and a basic week for 
the purpose of fixing compensation.'' 
Shortly thereafter, the board of public works adopted a 
resolution directing the superintendent of the railway to 
arrange the schedules so that no platform man or bus oper-
ator would be employed on the seventh consecutive day 
(except men on the extra list who had worked less than 48 
hours in six days; all work on the seventh day to be paid 
for at time and one-half) ; that a minimum of overtime would 
be required of an employee who worked eight hours in any 
given day; and to fix 11 hours as the maximum range to 
be used. 
In 1932, the manager of the railway issued a bulletin which 
stated: "Commencing Monday, April 25, ... no allowance 
will be made in the way of overtime for runs which extend 
beyond a range of ten (10) hours." This rule was revoked 
by a new bulletin issued in 1935 which allowed overtime 
"for runs which extend beyond a range of ten ( 10) hours." 
·william H. Scott, now general manager of the railway, 
testified that from 1917 until the creation of the present 
public utilities commission in 1932, he represented the railway 
in all labor negotiations. During that period of time, he 
said, he was never confronted with any demands based upon 
a guaranteed eight-hour day. The first time such a demand 
was made by any employee of the railway was in the spring 
of 1949. 
F'rom 1932 to 1945, Edward G. Cahill was manager of 
utilities. In that capacity it was his duty to certify payrolls 
of the railway. He testified that the 1932 bulletin did not 
come to his attention until sometime after its issuance, and 
the basic day and that therefor an employee working less than eight hours 
in any one day is not subject to this portion of the Amendment and 
may be permitted to work on the seventh day at straight time. 
''This may continue until such employee has worked 208 hours which 
is equivalent to 26 eight hour days, after which, the overtime rate shall 
prevail. 
''Providing that the time consumed in putting in the 208 hours shall 
have exceeded 26 days in one month." 
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late in 1934 he was approached by union representatives 
concerning it. After investigation he recommended to the 
public utilities commission that it be changed. The bulletin 
of 1935 was then issued. 
During those discussions with the union representatives, 
Cahill said, no claim was made by them that the men were 
entitled to an eight-hour day by virtue of the charter provi-
sion. Henry S. Foley, employed by the municipal railway 
for approximately 33 years preceding 1951, was one of those 
representatives. According to his testimony, in 1946 the city 
and county controller notified the railway management they 
would have to discontinue paying for "dead time"; at that 
time operators whose runs finished within 15 minutes of 
eight hours were paid for the full eight hours. Subsequently, 
Foley requested reinstatement of the practice of allowing 
eight hours' pay for such runs. 
William H. McRobbie, who has been an employee of the 
municipal railway for a number of years and a member of 
the same union as Mr. Foley, testified as to negotiations with 
city officials concerning the wage schedules. A committee 
of which he was a member met the mayor and the city attorney 
and discussed the question as to the legality of payment for 
work performed in excess of 10 consecutive hours. At that 
time, McRobbie said, the city attorney orally stated that, in 
his opinion, payment for such services was a legal charge 
against the city. Two weeks later, the 1935 bulletin restor-
ing range time was issued. Asked if at that meeting there 
was any assertion that the men, by virtue of the charter, 
were afforded a guarantee of eight hours a day, he said, "No, 
there was no assertion that . . . all the men would be guar-
anteed eight hours a day; however, we did contend that the 
regular runs should be eight hours and any work performed 
in excess of the ten hours spread should be paid for at the 
rate of time and a half; that was all that was discussed." 
[5] The employees attach some significance to two items 
which they suggest show an administrative interpretation in 
favor of an eight-hour guaranteed workday. In March, 1935, 
the superintendent of the municipal railway wrote a letter to 
the then acting mayor of San Francisco in regard to the 
provisions of the new amendment to the charter. In esti-
mated costs for an average month, the superintendent in-
cluded: ''Cost for time allowed for runs under eight hours, 
$2,898.23. This item does not enter into Amendment 21." 
The city explains this statement as having reference to man-
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agement 's established practice prior to 1946 of paying a full 
eight hours' pay for a regular run of seven hours and 45 
minutes. This seems to be the only reasonable inference that 
can be drawn from the statement in view of the low amount 
stated, and the interpretations of the amendment by the city 
attorney and by the president of Local 518 at about the 
same time. 
The second item consists of an unsigned memorandum dated 
September 4, 1925, entitled "Municipal Railway, San Fran-
cisco, data re working conditions of platform men." This 
memorandum was prepared in response to a written request 
from another transit company and consists of a short sum-
mary of working conditions before and after the effective 
date of the amendment to the charter. The memorandum 
includes the following: ''Previous to Charter amendment, 
schedules were made out on an eight hour day with no limits 
as to range, except that they were kept as near ten hours 
as possible. All reg~tlar runs under eight hours were paid 
full eight hours and time and one-half was paid for all time 
beyond eight hours and twenty minutes. Number of hours 
after Charter amendment 21? Conditions same as above, 
except that overtime is paid after eight hours instead of 
after eight hours and twenty minutes, and one [and one-] 
half time is also allowed after the ten hour range. . . . '' 
(Emphasis added.) The statement concerning eight hours' 
pay for all regular runs should be read in the light of the 
practice then in force of treating a regular run of seven 
hours and 45 minutes as the equivalent of a full eight hours 
regular run. Certainly, this does not support the finding 
that the ''administrative construction adhered to throughout 
the years of Section 125 of the Charter is not in contravention 
of petitioner's construction." 
The respondents contend, however, that even if section 125 
does not guarantee to them a minimum working day, they 
are entitled to it under section 151.34 which requires that 
•The portion of the section relating to municipal railway employees 
provides: 
''Notwithstanding the provisions of section 151 or any other provi-
sions of this charter the wages of platform employees and bus operators 
of the municipal railway shall be determined and fixed, annually, as 
follows: 
"(A) On or before the second Monday of July of each year the civil 
service commission shall certify to the board of supervisors the two 
highest wage schedules in effect on July 1st of that year for platform 
employees and bus operators of other street railway systems in the State 
of California; 
'' (B) The board of supervisors shall thereupon fix wage schedules for 
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the wages of platform employees and bus operators of the 
municipal railway be fixed annually at the average of ''the 
two highest wage schedules in effect on July 1st of that year 
for platform employees and bus operators of other street rail-
way systems in the State of California." It is argued that 
"the average of the two highest wage schedules" includes 
the right to receive any guarantee of wages or hours included 
in such schedules. 
The whole of section 151.3 is a qualification of section 151, 
which empowers the board of supervisors "to fix by ordi-
nance from time to time ... all salaries, wages and compen-
sations ... of all officers and employees" of the city and 
county. According to section 151.3, where there is estab-
lished "a rate of pay for ... groups or crafts through col-
lective bargaining agreements with employers employing such 
groups or crafts, and such rate is recognized and paid through-
out the industry and the establishments employing such 
groups or crafts in San Francisco,'' the civil service commis-
sion must certify to the board of supervisors the prevailing 
rates. ''The board of supervisors shall thereupon revise the 
rates of pay for such crafts or groups accordingly." 
[6] But the wages of the employees of the municipal rail-
way cannot be fixed by that formula. For some years, nearly 
all of the public transportation service in San Francisco has 
been performed by the municipal railway, and, accordingly, 
there was no "prevailing rate of pay" established for street 
railway employees within the city and county. To set up 
a standard of wages, the second part of section 151.3 was 
added to provide a method of computing compensations based 
platform employees and bus operators of the municipal railway which 
shall be the average of the two highest wage schedules so certified by the 
civil service commission; provided, if the average of the two highest wage 
schedules shall be less than the rates of pay fixed for such service in the 
salary standardization ordinance adopted by the board of supervisors 
on March 18, 1946, the board of supervisors shall fix wage schedules 
for such service which shall be the same as the rates :fixed for such service 
in the said ordinance ; 
"(C) When, in addition to their usual duties, such employees are 
assigned duties of instructors of platform employees or bus operators 
they shall receive twenty (20c) cents per hour above the rates of pay 
fixed for platform employees and bus operators as herein provided; 
"(D) The rates of pay so :fixed for platform employees and bus oper· 
a tors as herein provided shall be effective from July 1st of the fiscal year 
in which such rates of pay are certified by the civil service commission; 
'' (E) Platform employees and bus operators shall be paid one and 
one-half times the rate of pay :fixed as herein provided for all work 
performed on six days specified as holidays by ordinance of the board 
of supervisors for such employees.'' 
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upon the average of the two highest wage schedules of other 
street railways in California. In effect, this portion of sec-
tion 151.3 represents a further qualification of the general 
structure of wage and pay determinations, applicable to a 
specific group of employees of the city and county. 
[7] The appellants draw a distinction between the two por-
tions of sectionl51.3 from the use of the term "rate of pay" in 
the earlier part, as distinguished from "wages" and "wage 
schedules" in the portion relating specifically to municipal 
railway employees. Although a distinction between those 
terms has been made (see Giannettino v. McGoldrick, 295 
N.Y. 208 [66 N.E.2d 57, 59]; Jung v. City of New York, 
76 N.Y.S.2d 235), clearly it was not intended here. The 
provisions relating· to municipal railway employees use both 
"rate of pay" and "wages," apparently interchangeably. 
(Of. subsections B, C, D, and E.) Both parts are aimed 
at providing standards of compensation for particular groups 
of city and county employees, and vary only as to the methods 
used in determining them. 
In Adams v. Wolff, 84 Cal.App.2d 435 [190 P.2d 665], 
the constitutionality of section 151.3 was upheld. There, 
the question before the court was whether, in determining 
prevailing rates of pay for groups and crafts, the civil service 
commission was required to include pay for holidays and 
premium pay for night work. It was argued by the city that 
the section contemplates only a basic rate of pay and was 
not intended to govern >vorking conditions. The court said: 
"It is probably true that section 151.3 relates only to the 
'basic' rate of pay and does not relate to 'working condi-
tions.' But that in no way assists defendants. It is quite 
apparent that it was the intent of section 151.3 to give to 
the public employees of the type here involved the same 
take home pay received by private employees in the same 
industry. That means that when the public employees work 
on a night shift, or where a work week is interrupted by a 
holiday they are to receive the same pay that private em-
ployees would receive for work similarly performed. It is 
quite obvious that night shift pay and pay for holidays is 
a part of the 'basic' rate of pay, and is as much a part of 
the wage structure as the hourly wage itself." (Pp. 444-445.) 
Subsequently, in Adams v. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 94 Cal.App.2d 586 [211 P.2d 368, 212 P.2d 272], the 
court considered the question of whether, under the general 
provisions of section 151.3, the right of employees to vaca-
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tions and to sick and disability leaves was to be governed 
by the "prevailing rate of pay" of similar groups and crafts 
in the industry. It was held that the right to sick and dis-
ability leave was governed by other specific sections of the 
charter. But, on the authority of Adams v. Wolff, the court 
concluded that vacation pay, too, is an item of take home 
pay as defined in the earlier decision. 
In both of the Adams cases, the court equated "basic rate 
of pay" with "take home pay," but did not attempt to 
define either of those terms. It was recognized, however, 
that the apparent purpose of the section is to provide a 
method of computing the monetary remuneration to an em-
ployee, as distinguished from ''fringe benefits,'' or benefits 
derived from working conditions. The difficulty lies in decid-
ing whether a particular item is to be deemed "pay" or 
some other type of benefit. 
By the use of the word ''rate,'' the charter specifies a 
!Vage schedule made up by the measurement of one item 
on the basis of a unit or quantity of another.5 As applied to 
wages, it requires a computation of amount of compensation 
for a unit of work, in the case of municipal workers, being 
an hourly wage. 
It is unnecessary to decide whether the Adams cases were 
properly decided. Arguably, holiday pay and provisions for 
paid vacations might be considered to be items required to 
be included within a computation of "basic rate of pay," 
since ultimately, they have a bearing upon the amount of pay 
received for time actually worked, and sound accounting 
practice might require that they be so considered. However, 
at least insofar as municipal railway workers are concerned, 
specific provision for those items now is made by the charter. 
( §§ 151.3 [E], 151.4, 151.5.) 
[8] But a guarantee as to minimum hours of work does 
not affect the rate of an employee's pay, that is, the amount 
of compensation per unit of work. It deals only with the 
number of hours of work to which an employee may claim 
to be entitled. Such a provision is without the scope of a 
charter section establishing a method of computing a basic 
"rate of pay" for employees. 
"Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1948) gives this 
definition of the word "rate": "3. Quantity, amount, or degree of a 
thing measured per unit of something else; . . . Amount of payment or 
charge based on some other amount, as in money obligations; as, the rate 
of wages per week; . . . " 
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[9] This conclusion is strengthened by consideration of 
the practical results of a contrary construction of the charter. 
By section 151.3, the wages of municipal railway employees 
must be computed annually on the basis of the two highest 
wage schedules of other street railways in California estab-
lished as of July 1st of each year. By section 150, payments 
of wages for such guaranteed minimum hours may not be 
made to an employee who did not work for that amount of 
time. To pay each employee for a minimum of eight hours 
per day, it would be necessary to revise the entire operating 
schedule to provide work for such hours, and to revise it 
continually with every change in guaranteed hours of those 
wage schedules to which reference would be made. The evi-
dence shows that, particularly in the case of extra men, such 
realignment of schedules would be extremely difficult and 
costly. Certainly there is no reasonable basis for holding 
that, in adopting the charter section, the people intended 
such a result. 
[10] The respondents suggest that, instead of attempting 
to effectuate any specific guarantee of hours, the city officials 
should assign a monetary value to such a benefit and average 
it with the wages stated in the schedules consulted. .Although 
they recognize that such a process would require ''consider-
able consideration before an average could be struck between 
diverse systems of guarantees and diverse wage provisions,'' 
they assert that if the sole purpose of the section were ''to 
add two rates of pay, divide by two, and then establish the 
result as the 'hourly rate of pay,' " there would be no need 
to entrust that function to the board of supervisors, the 
highest administrative agency of the city and county. 
But if this contention were sustained, under like principles, 
the board should place a money value upon all other benefits 
received by employees under such schedules, and also upon 
similar benefits guaranteed under the charter of the city and 
county, and fix the wage schedule for the municipal railway 
accordingly. Such a construction of the section would impose 
the vast, if not impractical or impossible, burden upon the 
board of evaluating an endless variety of benefits. [11] It is not 
unreasonable to construe the charter as placing upon the 
board a simple averaging process. It has the sole authority 
to fix wages and salaries and, although it generally is vested 
with wide discretion in computing them, section 151.3 is a 
rlirect limitation upon that power. Moreover, in the first 
part of section 151.3, the board is directed to revise the rates 
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of pay of groups of crafts in accordance with the rates certi-
fied to it by the civil service commission, under circumstances 
allowing no room for discretion. 
In view of these conclusions, it is unnecessary to consider 
the points raised by the appellants in regard to procedural 
questions. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I adopt as my 
concurring and dissenting opinion in this case the able and 
well-reasoned opinion prepared by Justice '\Vood, which was 
concurred in by Justices Peters and Bray, when this case 
was before the District Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division One. 
''The petitioners, permanent employees of the city and 
county of San Francisco, platform men and bus operators in 
the operating department of the municipal railway system, 
brought this action on their own behalf and on behalf of all 
other employees similarly situated, to determine a contro-
versy over the interpretation and application of sections 125 
and 151.3 of the city and county charter concerning hours 
of work and rates of pay of such platform men and bus 
operators. 
''The action was brought against the manager of utilities 
of the public utilities commission of the city and county, 
members and the secretary of the civil service commission, 
and the controller of San Francisco. They were designated 
'respondents,' below. Joseph Robinson, a taxpayer of San 
Francisco, intervened as a respondent on his own behalf, 
and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated. 
''The complaint contains five counts. In the first four counts 
the petitioners seek writs of mandate; in the fifth count they 
pray for declaratory relief. 
''The trial court found for the petitioners on counts one, 
four and five, and rendered judgment thereon in their favor. 
The respondents, including the intervener, have appeared from 
the judgment.1 
"In addition to the major questions of interpretation, appel-
lants present these questions: Is the judgment uncertain and 
'' 
1 Hereafter in this opinion, we will refer to the respondents as 
'appellants' and to the petitioners as 'respondents' unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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contradictory in its several provisions? Are the respondents 
in a position, have they the legal right, to raise the questions 
which they present~ Is there a legal basis for viewing this 
as a class suit 7 vVe will consider the major questions first. 
"(1) In respect to hours of service and overtime, section 
125 of the cha1·ter states that 'Persons employed as platform 
men or bus operators in the operating department of the muni-
cipal railway system shall be subject to the following condi-
tions of employment: The basic hours of labor shall be eight 
hours, to be completed within ten consecutive hours; there 
shall be one day of rest in each week of seven days; all labor 
performed in excess of eight hours in any one day, or six days 
in any one week, shall be paid for at the rate of time and 
one-half.' (Stats. 1931, ch. 56 of Res., p. 2973, at 3050.)2 
''This clause was first placed in the charter in 1925, by an 
amendment adding section 20 to article XII of the former 
charter. (Stats. 1925, ch. 10 of Res., p. 1159, at p. 1164.) It 
then read as now except that in the introductory portion the 
words 'shall receive' appeared where the words 'shall be sub-
ject to' now appear. 
"Respondents interpret this cla?tse as prescribing for them 
a workday of eight hours within a range of ten hours, guar-
anteeing them eight hours of work in ten hours upon six days 
of each week, and awarding them pay for the full eight hours 
in ten each day even if the work assignment on a particular 
day covers a shorter period, such as three, four, or six hours. 
''Appellants interpret this clause as a formula for the pay-
ment of overtime (not as a guarantee of eight hours of work 
within a spread of ten each day), that it simply prescribes 
overtime pay (time and one-half) for all hours worked in 
excess of eight within ten hours and for all hours worked after 
the expiration of the ten-hour range regardless of the number 
of hours worked within the ten-hour range. 
''The trial court found and declared that this clause provides 
'that each petitioner and employee similarly situated should 
receive and be paid for eight hours of work in each scheduled 
working day, said eight hours of work to be completed within 
ten consecutive hours after commencement of work, and ... 
that all labor performed in excess of eight hours in any one 
day shall be compensated for at the rate of time and one-half 
the rate of pay for such work.' (Finding IX, C.T. 71; Concl. 
"•subsequent amendments of § 125 have made no changes in this 
clause. (See Stats. 1941, p. 195, at 202; and p. 3250, at p. 3251.) 
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of Law, (a) substantially the same, C.'r. 85) ; that the 'pur-
pose and intent of section 125 was to enable the employees of 
the Railway to complete a of hours of work within 
ten hours.' (Finding XX, C.'l'. 82; Concl. of Law, (k) 
C.T. 90.) 
"The judgment directs the issuance of a writ of mandate 
commanding appellant Turner, of the Public utilities 
Commission of San Francisco, to approve and transmit to the 
appellant civil service commission time rolls or pay rolls show-
ing 'that each petitioner and employee similarly situated is 
credited for at least eight ( 8) hours of work on each scheduled 
workday, in which each petitioner and employee similarly 
situated: (a) reports for work, and (b) performs each and 
every street car, bus or operating assignment designated 
within ten hours after reporting for said work . . .' ( J udg-
ment, (1) C.T. 94-95; follOV\'S Conel. of r,aw, (e), C.'l'. 86-87.) 
The judgment also declares that 'each petitioner and employee 
similarly situated is entitled to wages for at least eight ( 8) 
hours of work performed by each petitioner and employee 
similarly situated on each scheduled workday, in which each 
petitioner and employee similarly situated: ( 1) has reported 
for work, and (2) has performed each and every street car, 
bus or operating assignment designated within ten hours after 
reporting for said work' (C. T. 95; follows Concl. of I1aw, 
C.T. 85). 
''We do not find in this clause any guaranty of eight hours 
work per day, nor any guaranty of eight hours pay pe1· day. 
It is neither a minimum nor a minimum-maximum hour or 
wage per day provision. 
''This clause is so clear and cogent in its wording, we find 
it difficult to express its meaning in other words than those 
which it uses. Tt starts with the statement: 'The basic hours 
of labor shall be eight hours, to be completed within ten con-
srcntive hours.' Basic3 for what? \Vt) may reasonably expect 
to find that out latrr on in the sentence. Without more, we 
have nothing bnt a formula: Hight hours in ten. Next it says, 
'tl1ere shall be one clay of rest in each week of seven days.' 
This, too, is a formula; one day in seven. Next come the words 
that give significance to these formulae. They tell us the use 
we mnst make of these formulae: 'all labor performed in 
'' 
3 
'Basic' means: Of or pertaining to the base or essence; funda-
menta 1; as, a lxtsic fact; constituting a basis; as, a basic wage. (Web 
ster 's New International Dictionary, 2d ed.) 
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excess of eight hours in any one day, or six days in any one 
week, shall be paid for at the rate of time and one-half.' These 
formulae are to be used in ascertaining what is overtime. Use 
of the first formula indicates that labor performed 'in excess 
of eight hours in any one day,' comprehends all work done 
after the lapse of ten hours as well as all work done after 
eight hours of actual service. The second formula operates 
in similar fashion. All labor performed 'in excess of ... 
six days in any one week [all work done on the day of rest],' 
must be paid for at time and one-half. With this, each formula 
exhausts its function. The charter requires no further use of it. 
"Let us make another approach. It is a familiar principle 
of statutory interpretation that a declaration in a statute is 
directory, not mandatory, unless means be provided for its 
enforcement. The only means of enforcement here provided is 
the requirement that all labor performed in excess of eight 
hours in any one day, all labor performed after the span of 
ten hours in any one day, and all labor performed in excess 
of six days in any one week (all work done on the day of 
rest) 'shall be paid for at the rate of time and one-half.' 
Nothing is said about paying for labor not performed if a 
person's hours of work on a given day fall short of eight hours 
or fall short of eight hours within a span of ten or are less than 
48 hours upon six days of a given week. We can but conclude 
that this clause was not intended to require payment for 
labor not performed, was not intended to guarantee eight 
hours of work per day, was not intended to guarantee eight 
hours of pay per day. 
''Persuasive of this view is the interpretation made by 
the Supreme Court of the United States, of a federal statute 
which declared that 'eight hours shall constitute a day's work 
for all laborers, workmen, and mechanics now employed, or 
who may be hereafter employed, by or on behalf of the 
government of the United States.' (Act of June 25, 1868, 
ch. 72; 15 Stat.L. 77.) The court deemed this but a direction 
by the government to its agents and not a prohibition of 
the making of contracts which fixed a different length of time 
for a day's work. The court said 'the government officer is 
not prohibited ... from agreeing, when it is proper, that 
a less number of hours than eight shall be accepted as a day's 
work.' (United. States v. Martin, 94 U.S. 400, at 403 [24 
L.Ed. 128] ; followed in 1915 by the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts, in Woods v. City of Woburn, 220 Mass. 416 [107 
N.E. 985, Ann.Cas. 1917A 492], interpreting a similar state 
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statute.) Respondents cite three cases in support of their 
interpretation of section 125. (Chatfield v. City of Seattle, 
198 Wash. 179 [88 P.2d 582, 121 A.L.R. 1279]; Goss v. Justice 
of District Court of Holyoke, 302 Mass. 148 [18 N.E.2d 546] ; 
and Graham v. City of New York, 167 N.Y. 85 [60 N.E. 
331] .) But those cases are not helpful. In none of them is the 
precise text of the significant provision of the salary and 
hours fixing statute or ordinance completely furnished. In 
the Goss case, none of it is furnished. In the Chatfield case 
only the hours per day feature ('Eight hours shall constitute 
a day's work'), not the wage feature, is given .. The decision 
as printed does not give that portion of the ordinance which 
implemented this declaration concerning hours of work. This 
declaration, standing alone, unaided by an enforcement fea-
ture, would be directory, not mandatory. There must have 
been something in the ordinance which made it mandatory. 
In the Graham case the court did not quote the statute. It 
did say that 'the salary was $1,200 a year, payable in equal 
monthly installments.' That bears no similarity to our section 
125. 
"Let us also examine the city and county charter as it read 
in 1924 and 1925, during the time when this amendment to 
that charter was written, presented to the voters of San 
Francisco, and considered and approved by the Legislature 
of the state. 
''We find one feature of the charter which was particularly 
significant. Section 33 of article XVI declared: 'No deputy, 
clerk, or other employee of the City and County shall be paid 
for a greater time than that covered by his actual service. '4 
''If the proponents of the 1925 amendment desired to 
require payment of eight hours of pay per day even though 
on a given day a fewer number of hours of labor be per-
formed, they should have said so in no uncertain terms, in 
order to negative the prohibition of no pay 'for a greater time 
than that covered by his actual service' declared in section 
33 of article XVI of the very charter being amended. The 
fact they did not do so is persuasive of the view that they 
harbored no intent to make such a requirement. 
''Another provision of the old charter similarly serves as 
"•section 33 was a part of the former charter from its inception 
(Stat. 1899, ch. 2 of Res., p. 241 at p. 364) and continued therein, 
unchanged, until that charter was superseded by the new charter in 
1932. It was carried into section 150 of the new charter, enlarged to 
include officers. (Stats. 1931, ch. 56 of Res., p. 2973, at p. 3066.) 
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an aid to interpretation. 'vVe refer to section 7b of chapter 
2 of article III. It was one of a number of sections which 
dealt with street railway franchises granted by the city and 
county. They were added to the charter in 1911. Section 7b 
declared : 'Every franchise shall provide that employees of the 
person or company or corporation operating a street railroad 
shall be paid not less than three dollars a day and that eight 
hours shall be the maximum hours of labor in any calendar 
day, the same to be completed within ten hours; provided, 
that nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit 
overtime employment, wages for such employment to be paid 
at one and one half times the said rate of wages proportionate 
to each hour of such extra service. ' 5 Here we have in clear 
and unmistakable terms a minimum wage and maximum 
hours provision, followed by permission for overtime em-
ployment if paid for at time and one-half. With such a 
provision already in the charter, concerning street railways 
privately owned, its omission from the 1925 amendment, con-
cerning street railways publicly owned, suggests that the 
sponsors of that amendment intentionally avoided, studiously 
avoided, writing into their proposal either a guaranteed wage 
or a guaranteed hours per day provision. 
"Let us next consider the interpretation given this clause 
of the 1925 amendment by the ofiicials charged with its ad-
ministration, and by their legal adviser, before this con-
troversy arose and this question reached the courts for con-
sideration and determination. 
"The concurrent resolution approving this amendment to 
the charter was filed with the Secretary of State, January 
27, 1925 ( Stats. 1925, p. 1159), and took effect on that date 
(Pol. Code, § 324; now Gov. Code, § 9602). 
"Meanwhile (January 16, 1925), Superintendent F. Boeken 
reported to the board of public works (then in charge of the 
municipal railway) that schedules for all lines had been prac-
tically completed to meet the requirements of the new charter 
amendment. He estimated that of the 980 platform men 
required, 348 would be extra men, and estimated that the 
earnings of the latter would be reduced from $153 to $90 
per month. 
"Frank B. Halling, during that period, was president of 
Local 518 of the Amalgamated Street Railway Employees of 
'' 
5 Added to the charter by the Statutes of 1911, ch. 25 of Res., p. 
1661, at p. 1694. It continued unchanged during the life of the former 
charter. It was a part of that charter in 1924 and 1925. 
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America. March 10, 1925, he wrote Superintendent Boeken, 
at the latter's request, giving his interpretation of the new 
amendment. 6 He said in part' Our interpretation of the fore-
going [ § 20 of art. XII of the charter] and also the opinion 
of legal minds with whom we have consulted is that the stipu-
lations contained therein merely provide a basis of compen-
sation and do not prevent the performance of any labor beyond 
the limitations described. 
'' 'Supplementary to our opinion we refer you to the Adam-
son Eight Hour Law for Trainmen which while not identical, 
is in many respects similar to Charter Amendment No. 21. 
" 'We might also refer you to employment in many indus-
tries where the hours of labor must be stretched over a range 
that will supply the requirements of all concerned; in which 
event, the employer is subject to a penalty similar to that 
affixed by Amendment No. 21. 
" 'As an illustration of our opinion as to how the law 
would apply where the ten hour limit as set forth in the 
Amendment has been exceeded we present a few examples 
where runs exceed said limit : 
" 'Run 15-A, reports at 7:49 A. M. relieved at 11:19 A. 111:. 
first part; reports for second part at 2:14 P. l\II. and finishes 
at 6:36 P. M. 
" 'Here you will find that from 7 :49 A. l\L until 5 :49 P. M. 
is the ten hour range. 
" 'The law provides that the crew working said run shall 
be paid straight time for work actually performed therein; 
which is in this instance, 7 hours and 5 minutes, and, for all 
work actually performed beyond the ten hour range, which 
in this particular case is 47 minutes, they shall be paid at 
the rate of time and one-half or one hour and 11 minutes; 
making a total of 8 hours and 16 minutes. 
" 'Tripper runs would be treated in the same manner. 
"'36-J, reports at 6:20 A. M. off at 8:37 A. M., reports for 
second part at 3 :09 P. 111:. off at 6 :03 P. l\L 
'' '6 :20 A. M. to 4 :20 P. M. being the ten hour range, straight 
time prevails for all labor performed therein; which is 3 hours 
and 36 minutes, and the overtime rate prevails for labor per-
formed between 4 :20 P. M. and 6 :03 P. llf., which is 1 hour 
and 43 minutes; computed at the overtime rate is 2 hours and 
34 minutes, making a total for this run of 6 hours and 11 
minutes. 
""The parties stipulated that the San Francisco Labor Council was 
one of the sponsors of the 1925 amendment. 
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'' 'The other feature of the amendment relative to one 
day of rest in seven may be construed in this manner. 
" 'You will note that the amendment establishes eight hours 
as being the basic day and that therefor (e) an employee work-
ing less than eight hours in any one day is not subject to this 
portion of the Amendment and may be permitted to work on 
the seventh day at straight time. 
'' 'This may continue until such employee has worked 208 
hours which is equivalent to 26 eight hour days, after which, 
the overtime rate shall prevail. 
'' 'Providing that the time consumed in putting in the 
208 hours shall have exceeded 26 days in one month.' 
"During March and the early part of April a number of 
conferences, attended by Superintendent Boeken and other 
city officials and representatives of the men, were held in 
an endeavor to work out a satisfactory method of operation 
under the new amendment. April 15, 1925, in response to 
a series of questions propounded by the board of public works, 
the city attorney rendered an opinion in which he said in 
part : 'Most legislation limiting the hours of employes and 
restricting the number of days a week upon which labor 
may be performed, is adopted upon the theory that the 
shortening of time of labor promotes the health and comfort 
of the employe, and therefore, produces greater efficiency. 
But it is manifest from the very language of section 20 that 
it does not restrict the hours of labor for that reason. It 
creates a basic day and a basic week for the purpose of fixing 
compensation. It is expressly declared: 
'' ' ''The basic hours of labor shall be eight hours to be 
completed within ten consecutive hours; there shall be one 
day of rest in each week of seven days. All labor performed 
in excess of eight hours in any one day or six days in any 
one week shall be paid for at the rate of time and one-half." 
'' 'Therefore, it was manifestly the intention of the framers 
of this section of the charter that the men should be allowed 
to work in excess of the basic hours, but that in the event 
that they did work they should receive extra compensation. 
It is meaningless to provide a restriction upon the hours of 
actual labor when in the same sentence, it is expressly declared 
that all labor performed in excess of eight hours in any one 
day or six days in any one week shall be paid for at the 
rate of time and one-half. The act forbidding females to 
work more than eight hours in twenty-four is direct and 
positive with no provision for the payment of any overtime 
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and prescribes a penalty for its violation. (Statutes 1911, 
page 437.) So are all similar acts prescribing the limitations 
upon the right to labor.' 
"He was further of the opinion that the provision that 
'the basic hours of labor shall be eight hours, to be completed 
within ten consecutive hours' did not prevent the persons 
referred to from performing their work within a period of 
time in excess of ten hours; also, that it would be lawful for 
a platform man who had worked 8 hours a day for six con-
secutive days, to work on the seventh day, and that the same 
was true of a man who worked less than 48 hours during that 
six day period; and that 'the employe is entitled under the 
said section to time and one-half for any and all time after 
the period of ten consecutive hours has elapsed during which 
time he has actually worked,' and 'the employe who works 
on the seventh day is entitled to time and one-half.' 
"April 24, 1925, the board of public works adopted a reso-
lution directing the superintendent of the railway to so ar-
range the schedules that no platform man or bus operator 
be employed on the seventh consecutive day (except men 
on the extra list who had worked less than 48 hours in six 
days; all work on the seventh day to be paid for at time 
and one half) ; to so arrange the schedules that a minimum 
of overtime would be required of an employee who worked 
eight hours in any given day; and to fix eleven hours as the 
maximum range to be used. In that resolution the board 
recited in part that 'the City Attorney in answer to the 
inquiries of this Board expresses as his opinion that the terms 
of the charter amendment recently ratified by the Legislature 
pertaining to the Municipal Railway, do not prohibit the 
employment of platform men or bus operators on the seventh 
consecutive day, nor in excess of eight hours in any given 
day, nor beyond a range of ten hours in any given day, 
provided that in case said employee is employed on said sev-
enth day, or in excess of said eight hours, or outside a range 
of the said ten hours, he must be paid time and one-half 
therefor' and that "the amendment referred to was drafted 
and presented by the members of Division No. 518 of the 
Amalgamated Street Railways Employees of America, who 
were particular to have incorporated therein the following: 
''There shall be one day of rest in each week of seven days.'' ' 
"Thus, it appears that at the very beginning of operations 
under the new charter amendment in 1925, the officials 
charged with its administration and enforcement, their legal 
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adviser, and the representatives of the platform men and bus 
operators interpreted its provisions substantially the same as 
do the appellants herein. 
''Has there been any material change in that interpretation, 
over the years, upon the part of the administrative officials~ 
The evidence indicates there has been no such change. At 
the trial, the parties entered into a stipulation setting forth 
the significant facts concerning the establishment of routes 
for the operation of street cars and motor coach or trolley 
coach lines, the working schedule, runs necessary to service 
the routes, the 'general sign-up,' 'extra lists' of men, and 
other related matters, descriptive of the method of operating 
this railway as of the time of trial. The facts so stipulated 
reflect no change of administrative interpretation from that 
adopted early in 1925. The stipulation is too long for inclu-
sion in this opinion. The following excerpt will serve to 
illustrate the administrative interpretation which the facts 
recited reflect: '(10) At the Geneva and Ocean Avenue 
Headquarters, all of the employees on the extra list are re-
quired to remain on report time, and during a time when 
a run is not yet available, and are paid for said period of 
time at the straight time rate for not less than two hours 
and for such additional time at said rate as may be required 
by the Dispatcher for report time .... [Similar provisions 
concerning other headquarters] . . . On occasions, it occurs 
that a man on the extra list at one Headquarters is needed 
at another, in which event said man is sent by Management 
from the former to the latter, with his traveling time com-
pensated for at the legal rate; (11) Some of the men on the 
extra list are not afforded an opportunity by the Municipal 
Railway to work eight hours a day. The management of 
said Railway, including Respondent Turner and the Public 
Utilities Commission of the City and County of San Fran-
cisco, have, for some time last past, maintained and now 
pursue the policy of providing for work for men upon the 
extra list to the extent that each man thereon obtains a 
minimum, throughout a period of two weeks, of pay repre-
senting forty hours per week, although said man (referring 
to "some of the men," as above stated in line 23), are ready 
and desirous of working eight hours a day. ' 7 
'' 
7 The evidence shows a marked unevenness in rider demand each day. 
It is extremely high in the morning between 7:20 and 8:40 and in the 
evening between 4:55 and 5:30. In consequence, by 7 p. m. two-thirds 
of the equipment is withdrawn from service and by midnight demand is 
extremely low. · 
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"Concerning the continuity ·of administrative interpreta-
tion over the years, 1925-1951, some evidence was adduced 
at the trial. April 23, 1932, Fred Boeken, manager of the 
municipal railway, issued a bulletin which stated: 'Com-
mencing Monday, April 25, 1932, no allowance will be made 
in the way of overtime for runs which extend beyond a 
range of ten (10) hours.' April 29, 1935, these provisions 
were revoked by a new bulletin issued by the manager, read-
ing as follows: 'Commencing Wednesday, May 1, 1935, over-
time will be allowed for runs which extend beyond a range 
of ten (10) hours.' William H. Scott, now general manager 
of the municipal railway (from 1913 to 1935 he was auditor) 
produced the record which contained these bulletins. He 
testified that from 1917 until the creation of the present 
public utilities commission in 1932, he represented the munici-
pal railway in all labor negotiations. Mr. Bullock represented 
the board of supervisors and Mr. Hammond the board of 
public works. That was before and after 1925. During that 
period of time he was never confronted with any demands to 
the effect that the workmen on this railway were guaranteed 
an eight-hour day. The first time that he realized that a 
demand was being made by any employee of the railway 
to the effect that the charter guaranteed him an eight-hour 
day was in the spring of 1949 at a meeting in Mr. Turner's 
office, attended also by three or four union representatives. 
Edward G. Cahill was manager of utilities from April 1, 
1932, until October, 1945. In that capacity he certified pay-
rolls upon the municipal railway. In performing that func-
tion he was mindful of the requirement of section 150 of 
the new charter that 'No officer or employee shall be paid 
for a greater time than that covered by his actual service,' 
and abided by it. He testified that the 1932 bulletin which 
;we have quoted did not come to his attention until sometime 
after its issuance. In late 1934 he was approached by union 
representatives concerning it. He investigated the situation, 
took it up with the public utilities commission and recom-
mended that it be changed. This resulted in the above quoted 
bulletin of 1935. During those discussions with the union 
representatives, Cahill said, no claim was made by them that 
the men were entitled to an eight-hour day by virtue of the 
charter provision. Henry S. Foley, an employee of the mu-
nicipal railway for approximately 33 years preceding 1951, 
was one of those representatives. He testified that in 1946 
42 C.2d-ll 
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the city and county controller notified the railway manage-
ment they would have to discontinue paying for 'dead time'; 
at that time operators whose runs finished at 7 :45, and so on, 
up to eight hours were paid a full eight hours' pay. Sub-
sequently, Foley requested reinstatement of the practice of 
allowing eight hours' pay for such runs. 
"William H. McRobbie, engaged in various employments 
on the municipal railway over the years, a member of the 
same union as Mr. Foley, testified that he was active in 
the union in 1932, and following, to restore the range time, 
overtime pay for work done after the ten-hour span. Finally, 
his committee met with Mr. Cahill, the mayor, and the city 
attorney. There was a discussion as to whether it was legal 
to pay this penalty time for any work performed in excess 
of ten hours' spread. The city attorney orally stated that 
in his opinion it was legal. That meeting was about two 
weeks before the issuance of the 1935 bulletin restoring range 
time. Asked if at that meeting there was any assertion that 
the men, by virtue of the charter, were afforded a guarantee 
of eight hours a day, he said 'No, there was no assertion that 
the men, all the men would be guaranteed eight hours a day; 
however, we did contend that the regular runs should be 
eight hours and any work performed in excess of the ten 
hours spread should be paid for at the rate of time and a 
half; that was all that was discussed.' Concerning the regular 
runs, he explained that the city and county had been giving 
eight hours' pay for those runs which were in fact but seven 
hours and 45 minutes; that after the range time was taken 
away, the contention was being made by those who took it 
away that the pay for such runs should be only for actual 
time, seven hours and 45 minutes. He said that he and his 
committee did refer to the charter 'in this respect: That 
the implication was contained in that Charter amendment 
that would pay time and a half for all work in excess of the 
ten-hour spread; that was the main contention at that time'; 
that there was also talk 'for the restoration of that pay 
between seven hours and forty-five minutes and eight hours.' 
"Respondents attach some significance to two items which 
they suggest show an administrative interpretation in favor 
of an eight-hour guaranteed workday. The first of these 
appears in a letter dated March 19, 1925, from Mr. Boeken, 
then superintendent of the municipal railway, to Honorable 
Ralph McLaren, then Acting Mayor of San Francisco, con-
cerning the problem of complying with the provisions of 
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Charter Amendment No. 21, the 1925 amendment. Concern-
ing estimated costs for an average month, there was included 
this item : 'Cost for time allowed for runs under eight hours, 
$2,898.23. This item does not enter into Amendment 21.' 
Appellants explain this statement by reference to manage-
ment's established practice prior to 1946 of paying a full 
eight hours' pay for a regular run of seven hours and 45 
minutes. This seems the only reasonable inference that can 
be drawn considering the relatively low monthly cost noted, 
and in view of the interpretations made of the 1925 amend-
ment by the city attorney in April and by Mr. Halling, presi-
dent of Local 518, in March, 1925. The second item consists 
of an unsigned memorandum dated September 4, 1925, en-
titled 'Municipal Railway, San Francisco, data re working 
conditions of platform men.' This memorandum was pre-
pared in response to a written request from another transit 
company and consists of a short summary of working condi-
tions before and after the effective date of Charter Amend-
ment No. 21. In it this statement appears: 'Previous to 
Charter amendment, schedules were made out on an eight 
hour day with no limits as to range, except that they were 
kept as near ten hours as possible. All regular runs under 
eight hours were paid full eight hours and time and one-half 
was paid for all time beyond eight hours and twenty minutes. 
Number of hours after Charter amendment 21? Conditions 
same as above, except that overtime is paid after eight hours 
instead of after eight hours and twenty minutes, and one 
[and one-] half time is also allowed after the tenth hour 
range .... (Emphasis added.) The statement concerning 
eight hours' pay for all regular runs should be read in the 
light of the practice then in force of treating a regular run 
of seven hours and 45 minutes as the equivalent of a full 
eight hour regular run. We conclude that these two items, 
viewed in their setting, are in harmony, not in conflict, with 
our analysis of the administrative interpretation. 
''This is all of the significant evidence of administrative 
interpretation which has been brought to our attention by 
the parties or discovered by us in the record. It does not 
support the finding that the 'administrative construction 
adhered to throughout the years of Section 125 of the Charter 
is not in contravrntion of petitioner's [respondents', upon 
this appeal] construction.' 
"(2) In respect to the fixing of 'the wages of platform 
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employees and bus operators of the municipal railway,' section 
151.38 of the charter directs the civil service commission, each 
year, to certify to the board of supervisors 'the two highest 
wage schedules in effect on July 1st of that year for' such 
employees 'of other street railway systems in the State .... ' 
''The board thereupon fixes wage schedules for such em-
ployees 'which shall be the average of the two highest wage 
schedules so certified' by the commission. If such average is 
less than the rate fixed therefor in San Francisco's salary 
standardization ordinance adopted March 18, 1946, the board 
shall fix the wage schedules at the same rates as those fixed 
in that ordinance. 
''Respondents claim that section 151.3 requires the com-
mission to include guaranteed hourly, weekly, or monthly 
wage rates, if any, in effect in such other railway systems. 
The appellants claim that 151.3 does not require the inclusion 
of any such guaranty factors. 
''The court found that in 1949 the commission certified 
that the wage schedules of Torrance Municipal Bus Lines, 
Torrance, and the California Street Cable Line, San Fran-
cisco, were the two highest. The court further found that 
the Torrance schedules provide monthly guaranteed wages 
ranging from $231 to $265 according to the number of years 
of service of the employee; also, that the California Street 
Cable schedule provided for a guaranteed work week of six 
days or 48 hours per week ;9 but that the commission refused 
to certify those elements of the two highest wage schedules, 
certifying only the hourly rate for each. In this connection 
we observe that the court also found that the commission 
when certifying the Torrance hourly rate, included the several 
monthly wage rates ('1st year of service $221 per month equal 
to $1.275 per hour ... 5th year of service $265 per month 
equal to $1.52884 per hour' and recited 'Factor used to con-
vert to per hour rate is-4;1 weeks of 40 hours each per 
month or 1.73.33 hours per month.' 
''The court found that because of the omission of the 
'minimum guaranteed work week features' of these two sys-
tems from the certification, the commission had deprived 
the respondents and others similarly situated of a 'daily and 
"
8 (Stats. 1947, eh. 2 of Res., p. 3264, at p. 3266.) 
'' 
9 Appellants do not question the accuracy of this finding as to these 
features of the Torrance and California Street schedules, except that they 
claim that the California Street 'extra platform men were in direct terms 
excluded from the eight hour provision.' 
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weekly wage equivalent to the average of the wages receivable 
by platform employees and bus operators' of the two systems 
mentioned. 
"The conclusions of law followed these findings. The judg-
ment gave declaratory relief and ordered the issuance of a 
writ of mandate requiring the commission to certify to the 
board of supervisors 'in addition to the hourly rate of wages 
of the two highest wage schedules in California, any guarantee 
of minimum daily, weekly, or monthly wage contained in said 
schedules, affecting the wage rate or wages.' 
''Although this conclusion may have been based in part 
upon the premise that section 125 guarantees wages for at 
least eight hours each scheduled workday upon which an 
employee performs every assignment given him, the conclusion 
does not necessarily fall with that premise. If section 151.3 
should, in a given year, guarantee a minimum wage because 
the two highest wage schedules of other systems embrace such 
a provision that year, it would operate and apply to the 
respondents and others similarly situated quite independently 
of section 125. Especially so, in view of the positive declara-
tion in section 151.3 that the wages of platform employees 
and bus operators shall be determined and fixed as provided 
in section 151.3 'Notwithstanding the provisions of section 
151 or any other provisions of this charter.' 
"Let us analyze the significant portions of section 151.3. 
''It was added to the charter as a new section by an amend-
ment which took effect January 15, 1946. ( Oh. 8 of Res., 
1st Ex.Sess. 1946; printed in Stats. 1947, p. 219, at 233. At 
that time it provided for the establishment of rates of pay 
for 'groups and crafts' predicated upon rates fixed in col-
lective bargaining agreements, under the conditions described 
in section 151.3. 
''The section was later enlarg·ed by an amendment which 
took effect January 7, 1947. (Stats. 1947, ch. 2 of Res., p. 
3264, at 3266.) The amendment slightly modified the original 
text and added the provisions which now govern the fixing of 
wage schedules for platform men and bus operators. In this 
form section 151.3 consists of two distinct parts, although 
not separately designated as such by paragraph or subdivision 
numbers. For convenience of reference we designate them as 
Part I (the original text as modified in 1947) and Part II 
(the substantive addition made in 1947). 
"It is important to consider both parts, for Part I has 
been judicially interpreted. That interpretation may be 
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helpful in ascertaining the meaning of Part II. The signifi-
cant portions of the section read as follows: 
" 'Section 151.3 [Part I] Notwithstanding any of the pro-
visions of section 151 or any other provisions of this charter, 
whenever any groups or crafts establish a rate of pay for such 
groups or crafts through collective bargaining agreements 
with employers employing such groups or crafts, and such 
rate is recognized and paid throughout the industry and the 
establishments employing such groups or crafts in San Fran-
cisco, and the civil service commission shall certify that such 
rate is generally prevailing for such groups or crafts in private 
employment in San Francisco pursuant to collective bar-
g·aining agreements, the board of supervisors shall have the 
power and it shall be its duty to fix such rate of pay as the 
eompensation for such groups and crafts engaged in the city 
and county service. rrhe rate of pay so fixed by the board of 
supervisors shall be determined on the basis of rates of pay 
certified by the civil service commission on or prior to April 
1st of each year and shall be effective July 1st following; 
provided, that the civil service commission shall review all 
such agreements as of July 1st of each year and certify to 
the board of supervisors on or before the second Monday of 
July any modifications in rates of pay established thereunder 
for such crafts or groups as herein provided. The board of 
supervisors shall thereupon revise the rates of pay for such 
crafts or groups accordingly and the said revised rates of 
pay so fixed shall be effective from July 1st of the fiscal year 
in which the said revisions are determined .... 
" '[Part II] Notwithstanding the provisions of section 
151 or any other provisions of this charter the wages of plat-
form employees and bus operators of the municipal railway 
shall be determined and fixed, annually, as follows: 
'' ' (A) On or before the second Monday of July of each 
year the civil service commission shall certify to the board 
of supervisors the two highest wage schedules in effect on 
July 1st of that year for platform employees and bus oper-
ators of other street railway systems in the State of Cali-
fornia; 
" '(B) The board of supervisors shall thereupon fix wage 
schedules for platform employees and bus operators of the 
municipal railway which shall be the average of the two highest 
wage schedules so certified by the civil service commission; 
provided, if the average of the two highest wage schedules 
shall be less than the rates of pay fixed for such service in 
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the salary standardization ordinance adopted by the board of 
supervisors on March 18, 1946, the board of supervisors shall 
fix wage schedules for such service which shall be the same 
as the rates fixed for such service in the said ordinance; 
" ' (C) ·when, in addition to their usual duties, such em-
ployees are assigned duties of instructors of platform em-
ployees or bus operators they shall receive twenty (20¢) 
cents per hour above the rates of pay fixed for platform em-
ployees and bus operators as herein provided; 
'' ' (D) The rates of pay so fixed for platform employees 
and bus operators as herein provided shall be effective from 
July 1st of the fiscal year in which such rates of pay are 
certified by the civil service commission; 
" ' (E) Platform employees and bus operators shall be 
paid one and one-half times the rate of pay fixed as herein 
provided for all work performed on six days specified as 
holidays by ordinance of the board of supervisors for such 
employees 0 0 • ' 
' 'Part I was interpreted by this court in Adams v. W oljj, 
84 Cal.App.2d 435 [190 P.2d 665]. (A petition for a hearing 
by the Supreme Court was denied by that court.) The case 
involved the rates of pay of municipally employed machinists 
and mechanics. 
''The pertinent collective bargaining agreements prescribed 
pay at a fixed sum for day work on the basis of a work week 
consisting of five days, except that when certain holidays fell 
on work days the same rate of pay per week was fixed, pay 
for a four-day week with such holidays off without loss of 
pay. Also, those agreements increased the rate of pay 10 
per cent and 15 per cent respectively, for work on night and 
midnight shifts. They also provided that a foreman would 
receive 10 per cent in excess of the journeyman rate. (The 
city conceded the foreman pay differential if Part I were 
found constitutional.) 
''The judgment of the trial court allowed the holiday pay, 
the increased rates for night and midnight shifts, and the 
increased rate for foremen. We affirmed the judgment. 
"We did so after analyzing the section [Part I] and 
finding that by it 'the people have set up a standard for de-
termining rates of pay that will insure these public employees 
a wage scale commensurate with wages received by workers in 
the same field in private industry.' (Po 443.) 
''Concerning holiday pay and premium pay on the night 
and midnight shifts, we said: 'Section 15103 requires the 
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"rate of pay" to be fixed in the manner there set forth. It 
is contended that this relates only to the "basic" rate of 
pay, and that holiday and premium pay on night shifts does 
not relate to the "basic" rate of pay but relates to "working 
conditions,'' and it is urged that the fixing of working condi-
tions is beyond the scope of section 151.3. It is probably 
true that section 151.3 relates only to the "basic" rate of 
pay and does not relate to "working conditions." But that 
in no way assists defendants. It is quite apparent that it 
was the intent of section 151.3 to give to the public employees 
of the type here involved the same take home pay received by 
private employees in the same industry. 'fhat means that when 
the public employees work on a night shift, or where a work 
week is interrupted by a holiday they are to receive the same 
pay that private employees would receive for work similarly 
performed. It is quite obvious that night shift pay and pay 
for holidays is a part of the "basic" rate of pay, and is as 
much a part of the wage structure as the hourly wage itself. 
If evidence were necessary on such an obvious matter it was 
supplied by Norman Beals, San Francisco representative for 
the State Personnel Board, who so testified. The "basic" 
"rate of pay" is. the take home pay of the employee. The 
charter provision guarantees that the take home pay of public 
employees shall be the same as private employees. That 
obviously includes holidays and premium pay for night 
work.' (Pp. 444-445.) 
"Later, we had for consideration the question whether 
or not Part I of section 151.3 envisioned and embraced pro-
visions for vacation with pay (five days each year, after one 
year of service ; ten days, after three years of service) if 
contained in the pertinent collective bargaining agreements. 
We concluded that it did, by the same process of reasoning 
as that used in Adams v. Wolff, supra. (Adams v. City &; 
Cotmty of Ban Francisco, 94 Cal.App.2d 586 [211 P.2d 368, 
212 P.2d 272]. A petition for hearing by the Supreme Court 
was denied by that court.) We said: 'the "rate of pay" is 
the ''take home pay'' of those on the list of employees in good 
standing eligible for active duty .... Pay for an unworked 
holiday is part of the basic rate of pay. (Adams v. Wolff, 
supra.) The number of holidays is de:;;ignated in the private 
collective bargaining agreement. With equal right and author-
ity may the same agreement control the number of vacation 
days. The period of vacation, if any, set forth in a private 
bargaining agreement is the period that the public employees 
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must accept, for the reason that it is part of the basis upon 
which "rate of 'is computed.' (P. 592.) 
"'liTe further observed: 'The holding in Adams v. Wolff, 
supra, that section 151.3 [Part I] was intended to equalize 
take home pay and that holiday pay is a part of the basic 
rate of pay must be considered controlling, and forces a 
determination that vacation pay directly and with certainty 
affects the hourly, the weekly, the monthly or the yearly wage.' 
(P. 594.) 
''The five and ten day vacation periods which Part I of 
section 151.3 thus prescribed, prevailed over the two weeks' 
period prescribed by section 151 of the charter because 
of the declaration at the very beginning of Part I that its 
provisions operate and apply 'notwithstanding the provisions 
of section 151.' Later, the addition of sections 151.410 and 
151.511 modified the scope of section 151.3 (both Part I and 
Part II) in relation to vacation privileges. That modification 
leaves intact the scope and application of Parts I and II of 
section 151.3 in relation to other 'take home pay' features 
appearing in collective bargaining agreements or in the 'two 
highest wage schedules.' 
''Section 151.5 in declaring that vacation rights 'contained 
. . . in any street railway or bus wages schedules,' as well 
as those 'contained in any collective bargaining agreements,' 
shall 'in no way increase, reduce, or otherwise affect or be 
deemed to affect' the 'wage of pay rate or schedule determina-
tions made pursuant to the provisions of said section 151.3,' 
recognizes the possibility that Part II as well as Part I compre-
hends and embraces guaranteed or minimum wages. We do 
not view these provisions as a legislative interpretation or 
determination that section 151.5 does comprehend and embrace 
such features. It is probable that these references to Part II 
of section 151.3 were of a precautionary nature, to preclude 
the possibility of such an interpretation in relation to 'vaca-
tion rights,' especially in view of the use of the words 'or be 
deemed to affeet.' Significantly, however, section 151.5 re-
moves from the purview of section 151.3 [Part II as well as 
Part I] only the vacation with pay element of the take home 
pay feature, no other element thereof, such as premium pay 
for night shifts or guaranteed daily, weekly, or monthly wages. 
'' 
10 § 151.4 added: 1949 first Ex. Sess., ch. 4; Stats. 1950, p. 36 at 46. 
"
11 § 151.5 added: 1950 third Ex. Sess., ch. 10; Stats. 1951, p. 100, at 
102. 
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"vVhat of the similarity, if any, of the provisions of Part li 
of section 151.3 to Part I of that section, and the applicability 
to Part II of our interpretation of Part I? 
'' 'J'hey are similar in this: Each reaches out for a yardstick; 
Part I to collective bargaining agreements in private industry, 
Part II to other street railway systems, public or private. Part 
I uses the term 'rates of pay' ; Part II, 'wage schedules.' Part 
I uses the rate ('such rate'), established by collective bargain-
ing agreements, which is 'generally prevailing' in San Fran-
cisco. Part II uses 'the average of the two highest wage sched-
ules' of other street railway systems than the San Francisco 
municipal railway system. 
' ' The only seeming differences 12 are : (a) 'The average' in 
Part II, instead of 'such rate' in Part I; and (b) 'wage sched-
ules' in Part II, in contrast to 'rates of pay' in Part I. Neither 
of these is a differentiating factor. 'The average rate' denotes 
a fixed and certain quantity or quality, equally as does 'such 
rate.' 'Wages schedules' is equally as comprehensive in its 
scope and sweep as is the expression 'rates of pay'; perhaps 
more comprehensive, certainly not less comprehensive. 
''The conclusion seems irresistible that Part II sets up a 
standard for determining wage schedules (rates of pay) that 
will assure the municipal platform men and bus operators of 
San Francisco a wage scale commensurate with the highest 
wages received by workers in the same field in this state (the 
same take home pay), using the average of the two highest as 
a yardstick. 
"vVe conclude that Part II comprehends 'guaranteed or 
minimum daily, weekly, or monthly wages' (as found by the 
trial court), within the scope of the yardstick prescribed by 
Part II of section 151.3 as factors to be ascertained and certi-
fied by the civil service commission to the board of supervisors 
for the information and use of the board in fixing the indicated 
wage schedules. 
''Appellants ask how minimum wages can be averaged when 
one is a monthly wage and the other is weekly, or when one 
street railway system has a minimum wage and the other not. 
The answer is that this question is not here involved. It is 
the function of the board of supervisors (not the civil service 
"
12 We are mindful of the fact that paragraph (E) of Part II iixes 
pay at time and one-half for work done on certain holidays and para· 
graph (C) prescribes 20 cents per hour extra for instruction service, 
features not in Part I. These features, however, are limited in scope and 
obviously do not change the overall resemblance of Part II to Part I. 
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commission) to do the averaging, when it fixes the wage sched-
ules, and the board is not a party to this action. 
"Appellants make the further claim that, prior to suit, the 
petitioners made no demand upon the civil service commission 
to include the minimum wage factor when certifying the two 
highest wage schedules to the court. This, of course, has refer-
ence to the writ of mandate, not the declaratory relief count 
on that subject. 
''The answer is that the record demonstrates that such a 
demand would have been futile. (Moreing v. Shields, 28 Cal. 
App. 513 [152 P. 964] ; Moore v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.App. 
299 [128 P. 946] .) 
''Appellants further contend the judgment is erroneous in 
directing a peremptory writ of mandate on this subject because 
the alternative writ of mandate did not include such a provi-
sion. The answer to this point is that the respondents in their 
amended petition asked for a writ of mandate for certification 
of the minimum wage features of the Torrance and California 
Street Lines, and for general relief; the appellants joined 
issue; the case was thoroughly tried; and the appellants have 
not indicated that they presented this point to the trial court. 13 
The trial court, of course, did not in its judgment command 
the commission to certify the minimum wage features of the 
Torrance and California Street Cable Lines. Certification 
occurs each year. No one could predict what two street railway 
systems might in future years have the highest wage schedules. 
The court did appropriately direct the commission to include 
minimum wage features appearing in any wage schedule cer-
tified by it to the board of supervisors in any year in the 
future. In this situation, the principles enunciated in Buxbom 
v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 535, at 542-543 [145 P.2d 305], apply. 
"(3) We do not find the judgment uncertain or contra-
dictory in its provisions. Should ambiguities develop, we 
believe they could be resolved by reference to the :findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. 
" ( 4) The practice and procedural points presented by the 
appellants include the following claims asserted by them: 
(a) the respondents are not in a position, have not the legal 
right to raise the questions presented by them, (b) there is 
no true basis for a class suit, and (c) the judgment is incapable 
"
13 The alternative writ was issued in July, 1949. The second amended 
petition was filed in March, 1951. The return to the second amended 
petition was filed May 8, 1951. The case was tried on the issues thus 
joined, the trial commencing June 7, 1951. 
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of complete enforcement for lack of proper parties and for 
failure to include the controller and the civil service commis-
sion in the writ of mandate to Turner. 
"(a) The claim that the respondents are without legal right 
to raise the questions p1·esented by them seems predicated 
upon the asserted fact that the seniority of each of the re-
spondent(s) is such that he, in has an eight-hour day. 
This we think is not a significant factor. It appears to be 
true that a high seniority may presently assure a platform man 
or bus operator of a run of such a that he will be able 
to put in eight hours each perhaps eight hours within 
a span of ten; and thus also be assured of his minimum wage. 
However, it is possible, under appellants' interpretation of 
the charter that management in response to rider demand 
might find it necessary to readjust the service in such a manner 
as to reduce a good many regular runs to considerably less 
than eight hours, and divide others into parts, spreading them 
over a span considerably in excess of ten hours. In other words, 
it appears that each senior employee has this sword of Damocles 
suspended over him by a potentially slender thread. He be-
lieves that the charter makes certain guaranties. He should 
be able to have such questions determined before the sword 
falls. (The second amended petition in this action was filed 
March 14, 1951, and the judgment is not yet final.) 'l'he law 
accords him that right. He, therefore, is properly in court, 
asserting his claim. 
"(b) Appellants contend the'I'C 1:s no true basis for a class 
suit. They question the propriety of extending the benefits 
of this judgment to include other 'employees similarly situ-
ated.' 
''They present two bases for this claim. The first is that 
there are two unions to which the employees in the operating 
department of the municipal system respectively belong, no 
employee having membership in both unions. It is asserted 
that the respondents belong to but one of these unions and 
therefore cannot very well represent those employees who 
give adherence to the other union. This, we think, is a false 
quantity. 'l'he respondents appear in this action as employees 
of the city and county, not as members of a union. Neither 
of the unions, as such, is a party to the action. 
"The other premise iil that each of the respond en til 'is 
that each of the respondents afforded the identical work 
schedule sought for in this seeond amended petition, if they 
had not of their own volition, absented themselves from work.' 
Feb.1954] GowANLOCK v. TuRNER 
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f>""'""'"'"""' Opening Brief, pp. 61, 62.) From this premise 
solely for the purpose of discussion the accuracy 
of this quoted statement), appellants conclude that the re-
spondents do not belong to the same class or group as those 
operators, whether regular or extra men, who do not presently 
enjoy such a schedule. 'l'hat conclusion does not follow. For, 
as we have seen (in subparagraph (a), above), respondents' 
enjoyment of the sought for schedule (under appellants' in-
terpretation of the charter) is not a matter of right; i.e., a 
mere privilege, enjoyed today and gone tomorrow. This cer-
tainly puts these respondents in the same class as all other 
operators, whether regular or extra men . 
. "(c) Appellants daim that the jtLdgment is incapable of 
complete enforcement because of the absence as parties of 
the public utilities commission and the city and county itself, 
and the mandate to Turner does not run also to the controller 
and the civil service commission. 
''In this connection they direct attention to the fact that 
Manager Turner, who by this judgment is directed to certify 
time rolls or payrolls in a certain manner, works under the 
direction of the public utilities commission and the commis-
sion, not a party to the action, would not be bound by the 
judgment. They direct attention also to the fact that although 
the members and secretary of the civil service commission are 
parties, the judgment does not operate directly upon them by 
way of ordering them, when scrutinizing payrolls, to recognize 
the certification of eight hours per day per man by Turner. 
They make the same observation in respect to Controller Ross 
who, though a party to the action, is not by the judgment 
expressly directed to do anything. 
'' vV e may assume for the purpose of this discussion that 
the controller and the civil service commission and its secre-
tary, although parties to the action, might not be bound by 
Manager Turner's certification of payrolls. That would not 
necessarily render the judgment incomplete or abortive. 
Should the judgment in the form rendered become final, it 
would be binding upon Manager Turner and would govern 
him in the certification of payrolls. The mere fact that it might 
not be binding upon and govern these other officials, includ-
ing the members of the public utilities commission, would 
furnish no sufiicient reason in itself for reversal of the judg-
ment. There is no basis for assuming that these other offi-
cials would disregard the law as thus adjudicated. Should 
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they disregard it as thus finally adjudicated, the remedy 
would be the institution of another legal proceeding of an 
appropriate nature. 
''The judgment is reversed insofar as it declares that 
respondents (the petitioners below, and employees similarly 
situated) are entitled to wages for at least eight hours each 
scheduled workday (as stated in subparagraph (a) of para-
graph 3 of the judgment) and insofar as it orders and decrees 
that a writ of mandate issue ordering appellant James Turner 
to approve and transmit to the civil service commission time 
rolls or payrolls showing that each respondent and employee 
similarly situated is credited for at least eight hours of 
work within a span of ten, each scheduled workday (as 
stated in paragraph 1 of the judgment). In all other respects 
the judgment is affirmed. Each party will bear his own costs 
upon this appeal.'' 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-! agree with the discussion 
in the majority opinion concerning section 125 of the charter. 
It is my opinion, however, that for the reasons set forth in 
the opinion written by Mr. Justice Fred B. Wood for the 
District Court of Appeal, 1st Dist., Div. 1, when this case 
was before that court (Oal.App.) 256 P.2d 662, section 151.3 
of the charter requires consideration of any minimum wage 
guarantees included in the wage schedules of the other street 
railway systems. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
